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Abstract 
In combination with the rapid growth of mobile device ownership worldwide and some reported high 
profile cybersecurity issues, rigorous security testing techniques are required to ensure that sensitive 
corporate and domestic end-user data is kept safe.  The current wireless communication standard 
(801.11ac) forms the basis of the penetration testing framework for mobile devices on wireless 
networks presented here. Given a lack of a comprehensive mobile penetration testing framework, an 
augmentation of existing approaches is suggested.  A series of progressive open source tools are used to 
analyze and exploit various weaknesses on mobile devices with a view to validating the efficacy of the 
framework. Advantages of this framework include the rapid identification and implementation the most 
appropriate solutions with a limited time scale and a significant contribution to the professional 
pentesters toolkit.  Overall, this study shows that holistic, systems systems-oriented thinking is needed 
to more fully engage with the security issues surrounding mobile device security. 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Purpose 
This document is the final dissertation for the M. Sc in Systems & Software Security. It provides a 
framework for performing a penetration test on mobile devices connected to an 802.11 ac network. 
1.2. Background  
The ability to communicate freely and on-demand has led to significant and rapid advances in the wireless 
capabilities of many devices. The 802.11 protocol standard and its amendments represent the basis for 
wireless network products using Wi-Fi brand.  The demand for a higher quality Wi-Fi user experience 
encompassing faster throughput has led to the birth of a new standard known as 802.11ac. While wireless 
technologies and their application developments focus upon usability and feature rich enhancements, 
evidence suggests that this is often at the expense of security.     
The central focus of this thesis is to offer a novel interpretation and practical penetration testing 
methodology designed to detect and highlight potential threats on an 802.11ac wireless network.  A 
review of current academic and industrial literature has been carried out to provide a context for the 
subsequent methodology and design decisions.  On this basis, several appropriate tools1  have been 
chosen to analyse and exploit various weaknesses to validate the efficacy of the framework.    
1.3 Research Question, Aim and Objectives 
Given the rise in popularity of mobile devices worldwide, security concerns have emphasized the need for 
more rigorous testing techniques on these devices.  The contemporary standard adhered to in wireless 
communication technologies is the 802.11ac standard, therefore any penetration testing framework for 
mobile devices on wireless networks would take this into consideration.  The research question is oriented 
around the lack of a comprehensive penetration testing framework specifically targeted towards mobile 
devices on wireless networks.  To fulfill this research question the following objectives have been set out 
to define the scope of the research, 
1. A review of current academic and industrial literature in the area of wireless hacking and current 
penetration testing methodologies on mobile devices 
2. Appropriate tools will be chosen to analyze and exploit various weaknesses on mobile devices 
3. Validate the efficacy of the framework on standard technology 
1.3 Outline of Report 
Chapter 2 - this chapter examines the new 802.11ac standard, penetration testing methodology and  
       attacking wireless clients. 
Chapter 3 - contains the penetration testing framework design and the approaching to testing. 
Chapter 4 - analyses the results of testing and discusses the findings. 
Chapter 5 - concludes the thesis and proposed further research. 
                                                          
1 Tools listed in section 3.2.2 
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CHAPTER 2-Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review presented here will endeavor to demonstrate that the protection of wireless 
networks is of critical importance and deserves closer attention.  The current threat landscape is reviewed 
with special reference to wireless communication, the 802.11ac standard is evaluated, standard 
penetration testing techniques from contemporary texts in this are reviewed and finally the anatomy of 
an attack against wireless networks is critically analyzed. 
2.2 Today’s Threat Landscape 
While business organisations have begun to take security more seriously, their adversaries have also.  A 
report from (PWC, 2014)showed that an increase of 25 percent in detected security incidents and an 
increase of 18 percent in the average financial costs associated with incidents (PWC, 2014).  New 
vulnerabilities in computer systems are continually being discovered, are numerous and are well 
documented in many industrial reports (Ponemon, 2014; Verizon, 2013).  Of pressing concern then is the 
creation and implementation of techniques which mitigate against attacks via these vulnerabilities and 
which are also capable of adapting to future threats.   By their very nature, cyber attacks are designed to 
be insidious and stealthy.  Malicious actors spare no expense or time in the pursuit of their quarry.   Given 
the constant adaptations of these attacks to circumvent security controls, today’s security landscape has 
become incredibly complex.  If one method fails, there are many more attack vectors to choose from, 
ranging in difficulty from the simple to the more advanced. It is clear that no single technique, technology 
or behaviour will ensure security online, but rather multiple related activities from policy generation to 
technical implementation and user awareness programmes are needed.   Of significant concern are the 
insecure behaviours of Internet users and are key aspects for addressing cyber security.  Statistics from 
the UK indicated that among many concerns from end-user, small businesses believed they are safe from 
cyber-threats (UK Gov, 2014).  In 2014 a global survey of 4,881 IT and IT security practitioners involving 
15 countries reported that 57 percent of respondents did not think their organization is protected from 
advanced cyber attacks and more worryingly, 63 percent doubted that they could stop the exfiltration of 
confidential information (Ponemon, 2014).  The general public’s appetite for new mobile hardware and 
their associated applications shows no signs of slowing down and in fact appear to be increasing (Atwal, 
et al., 2014).  Results show a significant escalation in malware threats and campaigns targeted at both 
Android and Apple.  The attraction of mobile malware to the malicious user is obvious since almost by 
default, these devices permit access to vast amounts of personal information once the device is 
compromised (Symantec, 2014).  Be it the personal user, governmental state actors or contemporary 
organizations, there is reliance upon previous security strategies to combat highly skilled adversaries who 
are adept at leveraging advanced threats against multiple technologies across diverse networks 
distributed on a global scale.  Of some importance then is a critical examination of the standards and 
specifications of the wireless network upon which mobile devices rely. The specifications for 
implementing wireless local area network (WLAN) computer communication in the 2.4, 3.6, 5 and 60 GHz 
frequency bands is governed by the 802.11 set of standards. Modern devices are designed to provide 
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faster data transmission and in the race to develop and implement more efficient transmission of data, 
the standard surrounding these transmissions have also needed to develop.  What follows is an 
examination of the 802.11ac standard, the evolution of the technology in response to this standard, the 
existing security issues in 802.1X architectures and some possible developments in resolutions of these 
issues.   
 
2.3 The 802.11 Standard 
2.3.1 Background 
In 2008, the development of wireless networking offered the end-user the ability to transition applications 
from a more rigid restrictive environment embodied within the wired network to one of freedom and 
versatility.  The technical working group charged with the responsibility of analysing and subsequently 
improving the end-user experience noted that enhancements to the capacity of wireless networks would 
support higher bandwidth applications (IEEE, 2008) thus the evolution of the 802.11 standard gave rise to 
the 802.11ac gigabit WiFi standard. This section will describe the origins of the standard and the evolution 
of existing technologies. Speeds in excess of 600Mbps had already been achieved through the 802.11n 
standard however a Very High Throughput (VHT) study group was chartered with the goal of developing 
this further (Gast, 2013).  The Task Group was authorised to build a gigabit standard that was supported 
at frequencies less than 6GHz.  
2.3.2 802.11 Evolution 
The 802.11 protocols are utilised by millions of mobile devices in order to provide internet access on WiFi 
networks. The downside to this is that radio channels have become congested. To alleviate this, the 
802.11ac task group took a decision to allow the new standard to operate only on the less congested 5GHz 
radio channel (Gast, 2013). This was one of the improvements implemented in the new protocol.  Table 1 
below traces the major developments of the 802.11 standard, 
 
Standard Frequency Bandwidth Speeds Issues 
802.11a 5Ghz 20MHz Up to 54Mbps More expensive and no compatibility 
with 802.11b 
802.11b 2.4GHz 20MHz Up to 11 Mbps Prone to interference (shares airspace 
with mobile devices, bluetooth 
802.11g 2.4MHz 20MHz Up to 54 Mbps Prone to interference similar to 
802.11b  
802.11n 2.4GHz or 
5GHz 
20MHz, 
40MHz 
Up to 700 Mbps No definite beamforming method 
802.11ac 5GHz 20MHz, 
40MHz, 
80MHz, 
160MHz 
Over 1 Gigabit Mandatory 80MHz channel 
Optional 160MHz on 5GHz Frequency 
                                                                       Table 1 - 802.11 Standard Variations  
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The 802.11 standard allowed for speeds from 54Mbps to 700Mbps (Perahia, 2008). The next generation 
802.11ac standard can be thought of as an evolution of the 802.11n standard.  It improves upon existing 
technologies such as beamforming to significantly increase signal speeds. Other improvements to increase 
speed include increasing existing channel widths. To achieve this, the 802.11ac standard introduced two 
new channel sizes 80MHz and 160MHz. All 802.11ac devices are required to support 80Mhz channels, this 
doubled the 40MHz width provided by 802.11n. The standard also allows for a 160MHz channel, this can 
either be a contiguous block of 160MHz or two non-contiguous 80MHz blocks (Aruba, 2014).  The signals 
generated at these frequencies are sent through omnidirectional antennae however, given limitations in 
the omnidirectional antenna (IEEE, 2007) developed a technique to focus this energy known as 
beamforming.   
2.3.3 Beamforming 
Omnidirectional antennas are designed to send energy in a 360 degree horizontal radiation pattern and 
were first utilized by Conventional Access Points (APs) because of their cost-effective benefits and the 
coverage achievable as a result.  A potential disadvantage inherent in this mechanism was the fact that 
the channel was busy in all directions. Consideration should be taken when positioning this type of 
antenna as deploying an AP in the corner of a building means three-quarters of the signal strength is 
focused externally giving malicious attackers outside a distinct advantage. The alternative is to a 
directional antenna to focus the energy in a certain direction for example to a mobile device, this is done 
using a technique known as beamforming (Gast, 2013).  Beamforming was first introduced in the 802.11n 
standard as an optional feature.  Although the technology existed the standard did not define how exactly 
it should be implemented, this lead to different vendors providing different solutions leading to 
incompatibility issues. Being able to focus signal power greatly increases the signal strength. To achieve 
this, a new method of sending multiple transmissions to multiple receivers was conceived.  Prior to 
802.11ac all 802.11 standards were single-user with one transmission being sent to a single destination, 
whereas multi-user transmission, introduced in 802.11ac permits the same signal to be sent to multiple 
end points known as Multi-User MIMO.  Figure 1 below shows the distinction between single user and 
multi user transmissions where spatial streams are kept separate. This highlights the importance of 
antenna choice in conjunction with its placement. 
 
Figure 1 - Single and Multi-User MIMO  (Gast, 2013) 
Given that 802.11ac did not make any significant changes to the 802.11 security architecture, historical 
security threats still play a major role in WLAN deployments.  
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2.4 802.11 Security Issues 
Weak wireless network deployments represent a ubiquitous access opportunity for the would-be 
attacker. Mobile devices connected on a Wireless LAN require the addition of authentication to protect 
against unauthorized access and confidentiality for protecting the data in transit. To analyze these 
weaknesses this thesis will look at some of the common security pitfalls in WLAN configurations.  
2.4.1 Security through Obscurity 
Security through obscurity (STO) is a process whereby the security flaws and access points of a system are 
deliberately hidden.   This has become increasingly problematic for the security analyst since the 
prevalence of open systems, distributed networking as well as the average persons access to powerful 
devices, social media means that the opportunities to discover secret information is more likely.  
Fundamentally, STO relies upon a "need to know" basis and is considerably more difficult to achieve in 
the contemporary case.  As regards the Wireless LAN (WLAN), the SSID or Service Set Identifier is a unique 
identifier encapsulated in a header packet that allows for logical separation of WLANs. The SSID is 
considered to be a weak form of security as it transmits itself in plaintext and can be analysed by a network 
analysis technique known as ‘packet sniffing’.  Packet sniffing in combination with network traffic analysis 
is an inferential technique used by the security analyst to capture and analyze packets for information.  A 
standard tool used for packet sniffing is Wireshark.  Figure 2 below shows a snapshot from Wireshark 
intercepting packets exchanged between the client and network devices.  
 
Figure 2 - Standard Wireshark Output 
 
Many WiFi APs provide the ability to operate in cloaked or non-broadcasting mode (Meraki, 2009). APs 
operating in this cloaked mode will continue to send beacon packets but will omit the 32 bit SSID string 
replacing it with another value, typically a string of null (0x00) bytes. If an attacker sends a broadcast 
probe request with an unspecified SSID the AP will drop the frame and not respond with any content. SSID 
cloaking has been traditionally recommended as a defense in depth technique.  Unfortunately, this may 
be bypassed relatively easily.  Once such bypass technique called a de-authenticate attack, takes 
advantage of the fact that most wireless networks do not prohibit spoofed de-authenticated packets. The 
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attack works by impersonating the AP and telling one or more clients to disconnect form the network.  
When the clients reconnect to the real AP the SSID can be observed.   Even recent developments in MAC 
address filtering may also be bypassed. This is because most APs contain a function to configure a whitelist 
of client MAC addresses, therefore providing a means of controlling what devices have authorisation on 
the network.   However, standard network analysis tools can overcome this by observing SSIDs and MAC 
addresses in transit. Once these MAC addresses from a valid client have been obtained impersonating this 
MAC is a relatively straightforward procedure (Aerohive, 2011).  
STO represents an elementary opportunity for the penetration tester to gather valuable information 
about the wireless network. STO is a flawed technique as it does not hide the fact that the secret 
information exists only obscuring it from view. With minimal amount of knowledge and readily available 
tools it is possible to expose these secrets. Cryptographic protocols provide a means for protecting 
networks against unauthorized access. WEP and WPA-PSK are two protocols used for this purpose.  
  
2.4.2 WEP and WPA-PSK Protocols  
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol was designed to prevent unauthorised access to protected 
WLANs however weak WLAN infrastructure deployments represents network access opportunities for an 
attacker. Importantly, once access is gained to the network the attacker will use this as a beach-head to 
launch further mobile device attacks.  WEP uses the RC4 cipher for encrypting and decrypting data using 
64 and 128 bit keys, however it is a flawed protocol with issues such as lack of replay protection, weak 
keys and Initialization Vector (IV) reuse which may permit key recovery from a collection of ciphertext 
packets (Lashkari, et al., 2009).  Of significant concern then is recent research by (Bajpai, et al., 2014) 
which suggests that 16.82% of APs were using WEP, the average time taken to recover a key being 149 
minutes.  As a replacement for WEP, WPA Pre-Shared Key (WPA-PSK) provides the option of using a shared 
passphrase for authentication.  Similar to WEP, WPA-PSK uses a key of between 8 and 63 characters in 
length that must be provided in order to gain access to the network.  The encryption process in WPA relies 
on a Pairwise Master Key (PMK), this is created by combining the SSID and the chosen PSK that is then 
hashed with a HMAC-SHA1 function 4096 times. The SSID acts as a salt (a salt is random data appended 
as additional input to a password or passphrase) ensuring that the PMK is unique even if two networks 
have the same PSK.  
The client now knowing the PMK starts negotiating with an AP via the 4-way handshake. The handshake 
is a process that allows the AP and client to authenticate and derive keys.  The handshake is used to 
exchange random number values known as a nonce (a number used only once), from this an additional 
key value is created called a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK). The PTK calculation function takes a random 
number supplied by the AP (A-Nonce) and another random value supplied by the client (S-Nonce) as well 
as the MAC addresses of both devices and the PMK computed earlier and hashes it. 
PTK = Hash(A-Nonce,S-Nonce,Client-MAC, AP-MAC,PMK) 
The client is the first device to use the PTK in the handshake as it received the nonce from the AP first. 
The AP verifies that the client has the PMK by including a cryptographic signature known as a Message 
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Integrity Code (MIC) sent during the authentication exchange. If the MIC is incorrect it means that the PTK 
and PMK are incorrect as well (Cache, et al., 2010).   
2.4.3 WPA-PSK Key Attack 
When a client and AP connect for the first time, the 4-way handshake is sent in plaintext.  By capturing 
and observing this traffic it is possible to derive the client and AP MAC addresses, the Nonce of both 
communicating parties and the MIC, shown in Figure 3.  By observing a client login to the network and 
having knowledge of the SSID it is possible to mount an offline password guessing attack against the PSK  
(Sukhija & Shilpi, 2012). 
 
Figure 3 - Initial 4-Way Handshake (Explore Security, 2013) 
 
The attack involves first computing a PMK guess, this is done by obtaining the target SSID from a beacon 
or probe request then combining it with a passphrase from a wordlist and finally hashing it with a function 
HMAC-SHA1 4096 times. Next a PTK guess is computed using the derived Nonces, MAC addresses, PMK 
guess calculated with a single hash function.  
PTK guess = Hash(A-Nonce,S-Nonce, Client-MAC, AP-MAC, PMK guess) 
Finally a MIC guess is computed, if the MIC guess corresponds with the MIC observed in the packet capture 
then it is known that the passphrase is correct. This attack will only work if the passphrase is in the 
wordlist, the penetration tester may use a mutated dictionary file or files containing both words, numbers 
and characters. One technique for obtaining WPA passphrases is to use online services such as 
CloudCracker.com. By providing a valid SSID and a file containing the initial 4-way handshake the resource 
will check it against 3,000,000 words in 20 minutes.   
At this point the literature suggests that a penetration testing framework for mobile devices on wireless 
networks presents considerable security and privacy challenges.  It is not immediately evident what those 
challenges are, some of them will be intrinsic to the implementation of a penetration testing framework, 
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while other challenges will impinge upon the contemporary case from legacy issues thus creating an 
interesting intersection of technical, business and in some cases, legal challenges.  Dynamically mapping 
personal and corporate assets such as data and intellectual property to physical resources such as specific 
the mobile device itself, the networks interacting with the devices adds further complexity to the 
framework also.   In this context, the framework presented here, while limited, enables security 
practitioners to reconceptualise their security practices and offers some tentative solutions which may 
account for scenarios previously unaccounted for in previous testing paradigms.  At the broadest level, 
testing frameworks are a series of sequential procedures which organize the work of the tester under 
broad headings.  The dominant paradigms about which many are oriented are the OWASP’s Top Ten and 
the Web Penetration Framework, both of which are widely used in industry today. 
 
2.5 Testing Frameworks 
Since applications, systems and companies differ significantly in their products and services, concordantly; 
their approach to security will also differ.  Therefore, it is prudent for the tester to begin gathering 
intelligence such as information about company products, plans and facilities.  Automated tools such as 
IBM’s Appscan, Acunetix and Webinspect automate application security testing by scanning web facing 
applications to identify potential vulnerabilities.  Following the use of such automated solutions, reports 
and associated recommendations are sent to the target to facilitate ease of remediation.  It is important 
to note that while automated tools make the job of the security tester easier, they do not provide a 
comprehensive solution.  It is tempting to assume that the automated detection and subsequent 
subversion of a network or host can be automated. On the contrary, it takes considerable skill and 
experience.  To provide a holistic perspective on the security profile of any application, the security 
engineer typically retests the results of any automated tool for false positives.  Adopting this approach to 
penetration testing ensures that the most up to date research is leveraged against an application. While 
there are several penetration testing frameworks available such as the OWASP Top Ten (OWASP, 2014b) 
and the Penetration Test Framework (Orrey, 2014) their limitations are the same since testing is 
performed at a particular point in time, the amount of time spent performing tests is limited as is the 
experience of the tester.  That being said, the general structure of a penetration testing framework is 
designed to gain access to resources without prior knowledge of user credentials (SANS, 2006). 
2.6 Penetration Testing 
Penetration testing methodologies may be divided into reconnaissance, scanning, exploitation and post-
exploitation.  The reconnaissance phase pertains to passive testing in which the penetration tester 
progressively gathers key logical, structural and business information about the target over a period of 
time. The objective here is to create a comprehensive view of the available systems and potentially 
vulnerable entry points. The scanning phase leverages industrial tools to automate the process of 
enumerating the wireless network and mobile devices. This allows the tester to identify all services and 
systems currently available and which may be utilised in the subsequent exploitations phase. The 
exploitation phase, as the name suggests, is where the penetration tester exposes and combines any 
identified vulnerabilities to implement an attack. The post-exploitation/pillaging phase identifies risks to 
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the target organization determining the value of the system via the sensitive information it contains and 
transfers via traffic into and out of its databases. This information is typically used in further pivot attacks.  
Figure 4 below shows a generic penetration testing framework. 
 
Figure 4 - Generic Penetration Testing Framework 
 
Ultimately, penetration testing provides a critical report on the technical, logical and business weaknesses 
within said company’s network infrastructure.  With this information, it is then the responsibility of the 
organization to make judgments the remediation of these vulnerabilities and the risks posed.  In the 
contemporary case, today’s companies are acutely aware of the cost of breaches to compliance standards 
such as PCI DSS, HIPPA and the subsequent reputational damage they can cause (Morrison & Williams, 
2012).  Industrial reports strongly recommend regular security assessments be carried out and that these 
are supported by the implementation of clear, concise security policies in this regard (Gartner, 2014). 
Among the dominant models for penetrations testing, the OWASP Mobile Top Ten (OWASPb, 2014) 
represents some of the best to market solutions that may implemented and represents a suitable baseline 
from which to develop the penetration testing framework which is the focus of this work.   
 
2.6.1 OWASP  Mobile Top Ten 
Given the rapid uptake in mobile device technology, attacks against mobile clients are a cause for 
considerable concern to the contemporary security professional (Ponemon, 2014; Verizon, 2013).  
Progressive analysis of these threats has prompted the security industry as a whole to take the matter 
more seriously and on this basis, vendors, consultants and other industry experts were surveyed regarding 
the prevalence of such attacks.  The OWASP Mobile top ten contained in Appendix 2 represents a broad 
consensus of the current mobile attack landscape.  This thesis will critically evaluate the most pertinent 
issues in relation to wireless penetration testing.  
 
In 2014, U.S research firm Gartner released a report (Gartner, 2014) which indicated that considerable 
security challenges exist within most enterprises as regards mobile security in particular.  The report 
highlighted the tension that exists between application developers, who are primarily concerned with the 
functionality of their work, and security consultants. There are a number of factors contributing to this 
security shortfall. The first is the rush to market; statistics demonstrate the explosion of mobile 
Reconnaissance Scanning Exploitation
Post-
Exploitation/Pillaging
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applications with around 900,000 iOS and 800,000 android applications are currently available in their 
respective markets (MobileStatistics, 2012).  Another factor is the introduction of new languages such as 
Objective-C for iOS and a Java variant for Android and also new back-end services such as REST APIs. 
Similar to web applications mobile application work on a client/server model. In order to retrieve data a 
mobile application must communicate with back-end services. When a mobile application sends and 
retrieves data it does so through requests and responses. If an attacker can place themselves between 
these transmissions then they can intercept and manipulate this traffic, this is known as a Man in The 
Middle (MiTM) attack. The types of attacks against back-end services include SQL Injection, Cross-Site 
Scripting, Session Management and Authentication controls. Due to the prevalent nature of these attacks 
OWASP has listed weak server-side controls as number one in its top ten mobile list for 2014 (OWASPb, 
2014). When performing a wireless penetration test it is imperative that these transmissions are tested.  
Another issue that should be tested is how sensitive data is being sent over a wireless network. 
OWASP rates insufficient transport layer protection as the third highest risk in its 2014 list. If data is sent 
over an unsecured connection then it may be susceptible to eavesdropping. To prevent against this mobile 
applications should deploy SSL/TLS certificates from a trusted vendor. Even with a trusted certificate 
mobile applications can be vulnerable to attack. If the client and server support a known insecure hashing 
or encryption algorithms then it can be vulnerable to a downgrade attack. This type of attack occurs during 
the SSL handshake making it possible to trick the browser into accepting a lower version of the protocol. 
A recent vulnerability described in (Moller, et al., 2014) details a vulnerability in the SSL v3.0 protocol 
known as the POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) attack. When performing a 
mobile penetration test it is important to have tools that can perform attacks against SSL/TLS. 
One such tool for performing SSL based attacks is known as Sslstrip.  The tool was released to demonstrate 
the technique of SSL stripping introduced at (Marlinspike, 2009). The attack works by leveraging a MiTM 
attack to manipulate HTTP traffic. If a user visits an application over HTTP and is then redirected to HTTPS, 
the tool sends all the encrypted HTTPS traffic to the legitimate server but sends all responses back to the 
user over HTTP. Sslstrip does this by inspecting the traffic and rewriting all HTTPS links and replacing them 
with HTTP URLs. This type of attack allows a malicious actor to retrieve sensitive data such as usernames 
and passwords. It can be particularly useful against mobile applications as the address bar can be 
obfuscated or missed by the end user.  Another opportunity for accessing mobile application resources is 
to impersonate an authenticated user. When an application authenticates a user it maintains that users 
state by using session cookies. 
 
In order to track activities between a user and a back-end service mobile applications use session cookies. 
If this session cookie is intercepted by an adversary then it can be used to impersonate the user. This risk 
is listed in the OWASP mobile top ten as improper session handling. An example scenario would be a 
mobile application that uses encryption only for its authentication pages. If a user authenticates over 
HTTPS first and is then redirected to an HTTP connection post authentication, the cookie used to track the 
user can be captured in plaintext allowing for impersonation of that user. This attack is known as 
SideJacking (Kumar, 2011). Impersonation and eavesdropping attacks can lead to disclosure of sensitive 
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information and full compromise of mobile applications. Developers should employ techniques that 
reduce the window of opportunity for malicious actors, (Kuykendall, 2013) describes seven common 
mistakes made during the mobile application development phase.  Along with ensuring end-to-end 
encryption of traffic, developers should ensure that sessions have a limited lifetime and the use of a 
NONCE to prevent repeat requests. 
While elements of the OWASP Mobile Top Ten may be used to develop the penetration testing framework 
for this work another framework to consider is the wireless penetration framework from Orrey (2014).   
2.6.2 Wireless Penetration Testing Framework 
The Wireless Penetration Testing Framework is a subset of the Pen Test Framework (Orrey,2014). It 
provides a structured procedure for penetration testers and acts as a baseline for performing individual 
tasks. The framework contains a wireless toolkit encompassing a list of software and an outline of 
procedures to be followed for each task. The procedures begin with preliminary reconnaissance tasks such 
as performing site and network mapping, ending with attacks upon wireless clients.  While similarities 
exist between the work of Orrey (2014) and OWASP (OWASPb,2014) which both tackle the security testing 
of mobile devices, there appears to be a lack of a more comprehensive solution which might tackle 
technical as well as legal issues.  Therefore, combining elements from both Orrey (2014) and OWASP 
(OWASPb, 2014) specifically tailored to wireless penetration testing will permit the development of a 
novel and practical interpretation of how mobile device testing on wireless networks may be designed 
and implemented.  On this basis, several appropriate tools have been chosen to analyse and exploit 
various weaknesses to validate the efficacy of the new augmented framework.  A progressive 
methodology rooted within a review current academic and industrial literature and practices ensures a 
relevant context for the subsequent methodology.   
As useful as these frameworks are in developing an advanced mobile penetration framework, what is 
frequently omitted from these models are the legal ramifications of performing these tests.  On this basis, 
the United States has taken significant steps toward making the Internet, and the plethora of contexts 
within which it may be used, a safer place for business, education and private citizens. Regardless of 
country of origin the United States offers various legal mechanisms worthy of consideration (May, 2004).  
For many companies today, regulatory compliance standards ensure high levels of security for data via 
information security governance from a top-down approach.  This is manifested through such compliance 
and auditing frameworks as PCI, DSS, FISMA, GLBA, SOX, ISO27000, O-ISM3 and HIPAA (Takabi, et al., 
2010).   Depending on the data being held, used and transferred by a company there may be are a number 
of legal implications to be considered before performing a mobile penetration test. 
 
2.6.3 Legal and Ethical Considerations 
Several legal regulations are taken into consideration during an assessment and which are discusses at 
the outset of a penetration test (BSI, 2012). While there are no distinct laws requiring a penetration test 
there are certain legal provisions placed on companies to ensure that personal data is protected.  Section 
2(1)(d) of the Article 29 Working Party emphasizes the need for proper security measures to be taken 
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against unauthorized access, disclosure or destruction of data where the processing involves the 
transmission of the data over a network (EC, 1995). In order to meet this requirement companies need to 
implement appropriate security measures, this will be dependent on the size of the organization, the 
sensitivity of the data being processed and the financial impact of a data breach. As such a penetration 
test is a suitable way of auditing the effectiveness of these measures. When performing these tests it is 
imperative that consent is sought from the client, if this does not happen then an offence could be 
committed. During a penetration test, the tester may perform actions that could break laws if consent is 
not given by the client. Computer hacking is a crime with severe punishments. Given the documented 
escalation of cybercrime a transformation of legal frameworks has also taken place to deal with data 
security. The relevant acts which pertain to cybercrime include, but are not limited to, the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (CFAA) 1984 from the US (18 USC §1030), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 
in 1986 (18 USC Chapter 119) to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 (May, 2004).  Across 
member states of the European Union legislation has been drawn up to protect its citizens from cyber 
attacks. The European Convention on Cybercrime was adopted by the European Council in 2001 with the 
aim of providing legislation to protect society against cybercrime. The convention contains a number of 
articles relevant to penetration testing. Chapter two of the legislation describes offences that may incur 
punishment at a national level. These include illegal access, interception and interference of data in 
relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. Article 6 of the convention 
states that this does not affect the authorized testing or protection of a computer system (EC, 2001). 
While many countries including Ireland have signed this convention it has yet to be ratified. It is imperative 
that approval is sought prior to testing; if this is not done then the tester may be liable to committing an 
offence. 
In Ireland there are two common laws that could be applied to an act of computer hacking - the Criminal 
Damage Act 1991 and the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. The Criminal Justice Act 
creates two computer offences i.e. causing criminal damage to a computer and unauthorized access. The 
act defines damage to data specifically as "to add to, alter, corrupt, erase or move to another storage 
medium or to a different location in the storage medium in which they are kept ".  The penetration tester 
will not usually commit this offence as the person must lack a lawful excuse. If both parties, the client and 
tester, have agreed upon and signed a legal contract then the tester will not be in breach of the act as it 
is allowed by law. The Criminal Damage Act 1991 also provides offence for unauthorized access. The 
offence is created by s.5 of the Act. It states a person without lawful excuse operates a computer (a) within 
the State with intent to access any data kept either within or outside the State, or (b) outside the State 
with intent to access any data kept within the State, shall, whether or not he accesses any data, be guilty 
of an offence. While national legal frameworks may be different, there exists a shared concern to protect 
citizens against computer crime. It is imperative that the penetration tester is aware of the varying laws 
in different jurisdictions. To ensure that they are compliant there is a need for legal documentation to be 
drawn up prior to testing. 
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2.6.3.1 Important Terms in Contracts between the Client and Tester 
Prior to performing a penetration test a legal contract must be drawn up and agreed upon by both parties. 
The contract should describe the nature and scope of the penetration test, tools and techniques that are 
to be used. An estimated test schedule should be specified with a start and completion date, as the test 
will only be performed during this schedule it will clearly distinguish between a real and the penetration 
test. To ensure awareness of the test the contract should contain details of all stakeholders along with 
their roles and responsibilities. 
2.6.3.2 Tester and Client Responsibilities 
The penetration tester will be responsible for planning, execution and analysis of the issues found. During 
the course of a penetration test the tester may be exposed to sensitive information on vulnerabilities 
found, this may require the signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) (Klee, 2002).  The tester should 
be obliged to present a detailed analysis of the security findings and provide potential solutions where 
necessary. The clients responsibilities include ensuring that the target network will be available for testing 
throughout the agreed test period. Depending on the type of test the client may need to provide 
information about the network, for example if it is a white box test then IP addresses and other 
configuration details may need to be provided. As a system failure may occur due to a penetration test it 
is in the clients interest to create backups. This will ensure that data can be recovered if necessary 
2.7 Attacking Wireless Clients 
In a wireless penetration test the concern is not only with APs but also with the clients and networks 
connecting to these stations. In 2004 a weakness was discovered in how wireless clients connect to in 
range networks. Wireless clients have a feature that maintains a list of networks that they have or are 
currently connected to, this is known as the Preferred Network List or PNL. The client will send out probe 
requests on a periodic basis to check what networks on its PNL list are available in its current geographical 
location. The mobile client will then connect to the preferred network on the list based on the response 
from that station. The issue with this is that devices are disclosing the PNLs as they are being broadcast 
over the network (Taddong, 2011). This allows an attacker to identify all of the APs that a mobile client is 
connecting to and impersonate them. The attacker can then trick the device into connecting to them, 
allowing for network capture and manipulation. This attack can be achieved by setting up by configuring 
an AP to impersonate the captured SSID. An alternative method for attacking wireless clients is to use the 
Karma attack using a customizable wireless network auditing tool, the WiFi Pineapple Mark V (Hak5, 
2014). 
2.7.2 MiTM 
A standard technique for exploiting mobile devices on a WLAN is to execute a Man in The Middle (MiTM)  
attack. This attack can be achieved by manipulating the network traffic between the mobile device and 
the default gateway, thus allowing an attacker to capture and manipulate traffic. The most common MiTM 
attack technique is to implement ARP spoofing where the attacker sends forged ARP traffic, causing the 
mobile device and the default gateway to believe that the attacker is the other system. ARP is a protocol 
that is used to resolve IP addresses to MAC addresses for sending data.  When a device wants to send 
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something out on the network it sends a packet of data with an IP address to the Ethernet layer. The 
Ethernet layer then takes the IP and uses ARP to get its corresponding MAC address. The Ethernet adds 
the MAC to the frame and sends it out to the network where it arrives at its destination (SANS, 2006). 
The protocol achieves this is by sending a request out on the network looking for the MAC address 
matching the given IP. Devices on the network listening for these requests and if the IP matches it sends 
back the MAC address. An ARP cache is kept locally this reduces the number of ARP requests being 
broadcast.  
Tools such as Ettercap, Cain & Abel make performing this type of attack trivial. However there are certain 
pitfalls that the penetration tester should be aware of when performing this type of attack.  Configuring 
the tool to route all of the local network traffic through the one machine can cause a degradation of 
service or result in network downtime. It is therefore important to identify the specific target IP address. 
Figure 5 shows the ettercap command specifying all traffic be routed. 
 
Figure 5 - ettercap command routing all local traffic 
A relatively recent, popular approach for attacking mobile clients is to use wireless APs that are purposely 
built with the penetration tester in mind. These wireless APs can host networks allowing traffic to be 
manipulated as it passes through it. The next section describes one such AP.  
2.7.1 Wifi Pineapple (Karma Attack) 
There is a wide selection of tools for exploiting wireless attacks, these tools can be easy to use and 
executed with little skill or knowledge involved, one such tool is the WiFi Pineapple. The WiFi Pineapple 
was first released in 2008 at a cost of $99 USD, this low cost makes it an easily affordable WiFi hacking 
tool for security professionals and hackers alike. The pineapple allows for heavy customization through 
its enhancement scripts known as infusions. Once deployed on a compromised network the tool sits 
between a device and the resource it is trying to access, this allows it to act as a pivot point for Man In 
The Middle (MiTM) type attacks but not in the traditional sense. As already discussed when a device is 
turned on it automatically sends out probe requests to find out which networks on its PNL are available 
in its range. The Wifi Pineapple takes advantage of this inherent trust by initiating a Karma attack. When 
a device sends out a probe request to an AP asking "are you on my PNL? ", the pineapple says "Yes, I am" 
(Hunt, 2013). 
 
Figure 6 - Wifi Pineapple Karma Attack (Hunt, 2013) 
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Due to the dangerous nature of this trust relationship, leading vendors like Apple and Android have taken 
steps to prevent the Karma attack by changing the way probe requests are handled and implemented. 
According to the creator of the WiFi Pineapple this is merely a game of cat and mouse between vendors 
and security researchers (Kitchen, 2013).  During the writing of this thesis a new suite of tools known as 
PineAP has been introduced to the WiFi Pineapple… 
Another attack vector for mobile clients is attacking input entry points that are connected to back-end 
services. These types of attacks have been around for a long time but are still prevalent in mobile 
applications.  
2.7.3 Mobile Web Attacks 
When performing a mobile penetration test exploitation of native and web-based mobile applications 
may be in scope. These tests outlined in the OWASP Mobile top ten (M1) focus on finding flaws in back-
end services running protocols such as HTTP, HTTPS, SOAP and REST. Two such flaws are Cross-Site 
Scripting and SQL Injection.  
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks occur when an application takes untrusted data and sends it to a web 
browser without proper input validation (Scholte et al, 2011). This allows attackers to send malicious 
scripts to victims browsers allowing them to hijack sessions, cause defacements or redirect to other 
malicious sites (OWASP, 2014a).  There are three distinct types of XSS, these are DOM based, stored and 
reflected.  The Document Object Model (DOM) is a dynamic programming interface used in HTML and/or 
XML documents independent of platform (Kirda, et al., 2009).  When an attacker creates a client-side 
script designed to manipulate the DOM, DOM-based XSS is triggered which is classified as type 0.  Type 1 
stored (or persistent) XSS is typically exploited in forums, databases and comment fields and will persist 
until the database storing the attack is refreshed.   A non-persistent form of XSS also exists where 
interactions with the web server are reflected in the end-user’s browser and are classified as type 2 XSS 
(OWASP, 2014a).  Evidence from research suggests that type 1 XSS is the more prevalent and serious 
concern (Studdard, 2011).  This is significant since it is possible that the attack may lie dormant for an 
unknown period of time.  When activated by the unwitting end-user, the results of a type 1 vulnerability 
can be devastating.  In essence, it is simply a matter of time before a type 1 attack is executed.  As regards 
the type 2 version of XSS; with the aid of social engineering type 2 XSS relies upon random chance whether 
the end-user succumbs to an initial phishing attempt aimed at convincing the end user to click a link or 
open a file and could be considered as less reliable.  XSS represents a vulnerability leading to an exploit 
rather than an exploit in itself.  The XSS issue becomes particularly challenging from for the security 
professional given the increasing use of cross-platform, web-based mobile devices and their applications.   
 
Another common attack that targets back-end services in particular databases is known as SQL Injection. 
SQL injection flaws occur when queries are injected via input and executed by the back-end database. 
Successful exploitation can cause data to read, modified or deleted (OWASP, 2014d).  An example scenario 
may be a mobile web application that performs a book search function. The logic takes the user defined 
input and appends it on to the query.  
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SELECT book FROM bookTable WHERE title LIke '%User_Input%' 
Assuming that the mobile application allows certain characters to be injected an attacker can input a 
value that causes the query to break causing the interpreter to produce an error. In MySQL a typical 
error message would be shown as: 
You have an error in your SQL syntax. Check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server 
version for the right syntax to use near 'foo'' at line X 
 
After identifying the error condition the injected content can be manipulated to construct a valid SQL 
statement to return data. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
A review of the extant literature and relevant industrial practices suggest a dearth of specificity in the area 
of wireless hacking.  On this basis, the research question for this thesis supports the creation of practical 
augmentations to existing penetration testing framework for mobile devices on wireless networks.  The 
requirements specification to validate and test the framework is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3-Requirements Specification 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter includes the penetration testing framework design and the approaching to testing. The 
purpose of this section is to provide the overall design and the steps for conducting a mobile wireless 
penetration test. 
3.1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework for performing a penetration test on mobile devices 
hosted on an 802.11ac network. The framework will provide a base for testing,  
3.1.2 Project Scope 
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The penetration testing framework is split into four distinct phases i.e. reconnaissance, scanning, 
exploitation and post-exploitation. For each phase appropriate tools will chosen to analyze and exploit 
vulnerabilities. 
3.2 Research design and methods 
3.2.1 Penetration Testing Framework 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Mobile Wireless Penetration Framework 
 
3.2.2 Mobile Wireless Toolkit 
The tools below in table 2 are used to perform the mobile wireless penetration test. All of the tools are 
open source and easily obtained.  
Phase Operating System Tool Description 
Reconnaissance  Linux GISKismet Recon Visualization  
Scanning  Linux Aireplay-ng Active Scanning 
Scanning Linux Airodump-ng Passive Scanning 
Scanning Linux Airgraph-ng Client Probe Graph 
creator  
Scanning Linux Kismet Passive Scanning 
Framework 
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Exploitation Linux Aircrack-ng Framework for cracking 
weak encryption  
Exploitation  Linux ASLEAP Exploit LEAP 
Post-Exploitation Multiple OS BurpSuite Intercepting proxy 
Post-Exploitation Linux Kali Linux Penetration Testing 
Distribution 
Table 2 - Mobile Wireless Software Toolkit 
 
3.2.3 Hardware Requirements 
Table 3 below lists the hardware used in the mobile wireless penetration test. A USB wireless card is 
required to capture packets  
Device Model Description 
USB Wireless Adapter  Alfa  Wireless adapter compatible 
with Kali Linux  a/b/g/n 
WiFi Pineapple Mark V Standard WiFi auditing and penetration 
testing tool 
USB GPS Receiver  ND-100S GPS satellite receiver  
Network Router TP-Link AC1750 Wireless Dual 
Band Gigabit ADSL2+ Modem 
Router 
 
Operates on 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz 
ranges. Compatibility 802.11 
a/b/g/n/ac  
Laptop HP Pavillion  OS version - Windows 8.1 
iPad iPad Air iOS version -  8.1 
Table 3 - Mobile Wireless Hardware Toolkit 
 
 
 
3.3 Requirements Phase 1 – Reconnaissance 
3.3.1 Designing the technique 
Table 4 outlines the reconnaissance phase. This phase involves gathering information about the target 
site prior to testing so that the penetration tester may estimate the timescale needed to implement the 
full framework.  
Site Mapping 
The process of site mapping allows the tester to build up a visualisation of the target. A GPS receiver in 
conjunction with special software can be used to decode satellite signals so that the proximity of access 
points can be mapped out. The results can be viewed in Google Earth.   
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Phase Reconnaissance 
Process Site Mapping 
Tools Kistmet, GISKismet, GPS USB, Google Earth 
Objective Gather information about the target site 
Test Steps 1. Start Kismet tool 
2. Install GPS packages and hardware 
3. Identify satellites are connected 
4.  Walk the target site 
5. Use GISKismet to interpret results  
6. Send results to Google Earth 
Post Condition All pertinent information gathered 
Table 4 - Reconnaissance Phase 
 
 
3.4 Requirements Phase 2 – Scanning 
3.4.1 Designing the technique 
This phase involves identifying and analyzing wireless network devices such as APs and the clients that 
are connecting to it. The goal is to retrieve information that can be used to leverage attacks later in the 
lifecycle. It allows the penetration tester to evaluate the feasibility of an attack.  
Passive Network Scanning 
In passive network discovery the penetration tester listens for beacon frames transmitted by the AP.  
The tester uses a wireless network card to capture all wireless activity passively. Using this technique it 
is possible to identify wireless networks within range, SSID, MAC addresses, client information, channels 
and encryption used. If the SSID is cloaked it can be identified once a legitimate user connects to the AP. 
Table 5 shows the steps involved in the scanning phase. 
 
 
Phase Scanning 
Process Passive Network Scanning 
Tools Kismet, Airodump-ng, Wireless Network Adapter 
Objective Capture network details  
Test Steps 1. Start Kismet tool 
2. Add capture source (e.g. wlan0) 
3. Kismet starts scanning network 
4. Identify target network  
5. Enumerate information  
Post Condition All relevant information has been gathered 
Table 5 - Passive Scanning Phase 
Active Network Scanning 
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In active network discovery the penetration tester sends probe requests to the broadcast address where 
network activity is detected. Once the AP receives the request it may respond with a probe response. 
The information returned will be similar to passive discovery but as it is active there is a possibility that it 
may be detected. It can also be used to de-authenticate clients in order to retrieve hidden SSIDs (Table 
6). 
Phase Scanning 
Process Active Network Scanning 
Tools Aireplay-ng, inSSIDer 
Objective Capture network details 
Test Steps 1. Send de-authenticate message to AP 
2. Capture client disconnect and reconnect   
3. Reveal Hidden SSIDs 
Post Condition All relevant information has been gathered 
Table 6 - Active Scanning Phase 
Client Activity Mapping 
This is the process of identifying client network activity. As discussed in section 2.7 wireless clients 
maintain a list of preferred networks, known as a PNL. Having the ability to analyze client probes gives 
the tester the opportunity to impersonate networks.  
Phase Scanning 
Process Client Activity Mapping 
Tools Airodump-ng, Airgraph-ng 
Objective Identify and map client activity  
Test Steps 1. Capture and save packets using Airodump-ng 
2. Use Airgraph-ng to create a client probe graph 
(CPG) map 
3. Write to an output file e.g. png 
Post Condition Clients activity has been mapped 
Table 7 - Client Probing 
 
 
3.5 Requirements Phase 3 – Exploitation  
3.5.1 Designing the technique 
This phase involves exploiting weak wireless network deployments. Once the AP encryption type has 
been identified the tester can capture the relevant packets and use the appropriate test steps to 
retrieve the password or passphrase.  
WEP Crack 
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WEP or Wired Equivalent Privacy is an 802.11 standard used for encryption in Wireless LANs.  The 
algorithm itself uses the RC4 cipher and 64-bit/128-bit keys to encrypt and decrypt and ensure the 
integrity of the packets. WEP has a number of flaws including lack of packet replay protection, weak 
packet integrity checks and the fact that it is possible to recover the key from a collection of captured 
packets. Each WEP packet must sent with a 4-byte header containing a one byte index number and a 
three byte IV. WEP key recovery relies on capturing a large number of unique IV values. Refer to 
appendix 1.6 for a step by step guide. 
 
Phase Exploitation 
Process WEP Crack 
Tools Aircrack-ng 
Objective Gain access to the network 
Test Steps 1. Capture data packets using Airodump-ng 
2. Accelerate traffic capture to get required 
packets  
3. Recover key using Aircrack-ng 
Post Condition Access gained to WEP encrypted network 
Table 8 - Exploitation Phase WEP Crack 
 
Figure 8 - Sequence Diagram WEP Cracking 
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WPA-PSK Crack 
When a client and AP connect for the first time, the 4-way handshake is sent in plaintext.  By capturing 
and observing this traffic it is possible to derive the client and AP MAC addresses, the Nonce of both 
communicating parties and the MIC. By observing a client login to the network and having knowledge of 
the SSID it is possible to mount an offline password guessing attack against the PSK. 
Phase Exploitation 
Process WPA-PSK Crack 
Tools Aircrack-ng 
Objective Gain access to the network 
Test Steps 1. Capture 4-way handshake data packet  
2. Start PSK Guessing attack 
3. Recover key 
Post Condition Access gained to WPA-PSK encrypted network 
Table 9 - Exploitation Phase WPA-PSK Crack 
 
Figure 9 - Sequence Diagram WPA-PSK Cracking 
 
33 
 
 
LEAP Crack 
Cisco created a proprietary authentication protocol known as LEAP (Lightweight Extensible 
Authentication Protocol). It is known to be vulnerable to offline password dictionary attacks. The tester 
can use the ASLEAP tool to crack the password.  
 
Phase Exploitation 
Process LEAP Crack 
Tools Asleap 
Objective Gain access to the network 
Test Steps 1. Capture LEAP exchange information 
(challenges and responses) 
2. Run a dictionary attack against the LEAP 
exchange 
3. Key recovered 
Post Condition Access gained to LEAP encrypted network 
Table 10 - Exploitation Phase LEAP Crack 
3.6 Requirements Phase 4 – Post-Exploitation  
3.6.1 Designing the technique 
This phase involves the use of network manipulation techniques to intercept traffic going and coming 
from the mobile client. In this phase, access has been gained to the network, so now the penetration 
tester can deploy a rogue AP.  It is the primary objective to lure legitimate network users to the AP so 
that they connect to it.  When this happens, traffic from the user’s web applications, mail clients and 
database connections will now be logged by the tester for further analysis thus allowing the tester to 
enumerate sensitive information such as usernames and passwords.   
Phase Post-Exploitation 
Process Karma Attack/ PineAP attack 
Tools WiFi Pineapple 
Objective Compromise mobile client 
Test Steps 1. Start Karma/PineAP  
2. Wait for Client Connection  
Post Condition Client Associates 
Table 11 - Post-Exploitation Karma/PineAP Attack 
 
Phase Post-Exploitation 
Process Captive Portal 
Tools WiFi Pineapple 
Objective Capture client credentials 
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Test Steps 1.Customise portal html page 
2.Customise back-end code 
3. Start Karma/PineAP and Evil Portal 
4. Wait for client to connect 
Post Condition Mobile client credentials retrieved 
Table 12 - Post-Exploitation Captive Portal 
 
 
Phase Post-Exploitation 
Process DNS Spoof 
Tools WiFi Pineapple, BurpSuite 
Objective Capture client credentials 
Test Steps 1.Update hosts file to redirect to testers machine 
2.Configure IPTables to redirect traffic through 
testers machine 
3.Configure BurpSuite to listen on port 80 and 
443 
4.Wait for client to connect 
5.Intercept traffic 
Post Condition Mobile client credentials retrieved 
Table 13 - Post-Exploitation DNS Spoof 
 
3.7 Summary  
Using the OWASP Mobile Top Ten as basis for the development of the current framework the overall 
design for the mobile wireless penetration test consisted of four distinct phases i.e. reconnaissance, 
scanning, exploitation and post-exploitation with specific tools chosen to detect, analyze or exploit.  The 
framework begins with reconnaissance of the target which involves gathering enough technical 
information for the penetration tester to build a security profile.  Scanning involves the identification and 
analysis of wireless network devices which may be used by the target to transmit sensitive information 
and essentially allows the penetration tester to evaluate the feasibility of an attack.  Following this, and 
with a sufficient security profile developed, the exploitation of any vulnerability detected is carried out.  
With a comprehensive framework in place that the penetration tester may use, the testing of this 
framework can commence in a controlled environment. 
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CHAPTER 4- Testing and Evaluation 
With a suitable framework in place, the following chapter focuses upon the analysis and exploitation of 
any identified weaknesses on the mobile devices described in the previous chapter (see sec. 3.2) and 
determine the security of the wireless system. The testing process will follow the steps outlined in chapter 
3 and determine the efficacy of the penetration framework (section 4.5).   
4.1 Phase 1 Reconnaissance Testing 
The first phase of the penetration test is reconnaissance.  The purpose of this phase is to build up an 
overall visualisation of the target site to see how the client is set up. GPS is a satellite tracking system that 
is funded and controlled by the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD). However it is can also used for civilian 
purposes, during the reconnaissance phase  it can aid the penetration tester by creating a map of 
discovered WiFi networks and record site statistics. A GPS receiver can be used to calculate the position, 
time and velocity by decoding the signals of GPS satelites. Then by using special software it is possible to 
track the location of WiFi networks. GISKismet (Abraham & Smith, 2010) is a wireless recon tool that can 
be used to give a visual representation of data gathered. It creates an SQLite database file that can be 
queried and the results outputted to a kml file that is read by Google earth (Google, 2015).  The setup for 
this phase is described in Appendix 1.3 
4.1.1 Result 1 
The result shows an aerial view of the source capture that map out the APs in proximity. 
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Figure 10 - Google Earth Image 
By clicking on each AP it is possible to retrieve useful information such as BSSID, encryption, channel and 
clients. 
 
Figure 11 - Additional AP Information 
 
 
4.2 Phase 2 Scanning Testing 
The second phase of the penetration test is scanning. There are two methods that can be used during this 
phase, passive and active. In passive scanning the tester can detect the existence of an AP by sniffing the 
packets. In active scanning the tester can disconnect clients to reveal valuable information. The testing in 
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this phase utilizes a combination of tools including Kismet, Airodump-ng and Airograph-ng.  Kismet is a 
wireless assessment tool that captures data from a network interface in monitor mode. Kismet can 
passively identify all wireless networks within range and network details such as SSID, manufacturer 
information, security settings and client information.  The setup for this phase is described in Appendix 
1.4. 
4.2.1 Result 2 
The live capture scan result displayed during the Kismet scan (Fig.12) shows a total of 12 networks 
identified. Table 4 shows the information retrieved from the Kismet log file.   
Live Network Capture 
 
Figure 12 - Kismet Network List 
 
 
 
No. Manufacturer SSID BSSID Encryption Channel 
1 ZyxelCom eircomXXXXXXXX 00:C6:10:D4:1E:2B 
 
WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP 
0 
2 Huawei Vodafone-XXXX A4:99:47:8C:A4:3C WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP, 
WPA+AES-CCM 
7 
3 Technico MAGNET-XXXXXX A4:B1:E9:EB:22:82 WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP, 
WPA+AES-CCM 
1 
4 ZyxelCom HarkXXXXX EC:43:F6:AF:A4:D5 WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP, 
WPA+AES-CCM 
10 
5 ZyxelCom Cloaked EC:43:F6:B1:2B:1D WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP, 
WPA+AES-CCM 
10 
6 Technico Digiweb FC:94:E3:12:20:0A WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP, 
WPA+AES-CCM 
6 
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7 ZyxelCom eircomXXXXXXXX 40:4A:03:B6:44:87 WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP 
1 
8 Unknown TNCAPD1BBC9 5C:2E:59:DC:C7:DE None 0 
9 ZyxelCom eircomXXXXXXXX EC:43:F6:45:86:D1 WPA+PSK, 
WPA+TKIP, 
WPA+AES-CCM 
11 
Table 14 - Kismet Results 
The Kismet tool displayed the string ‘<Hidden SSID>’. After scanning for 48 minutes the tool replaced the 
string with the actual SSID ‘<TestWireless>’. This occurred because the tool observed a client connecting 
to the network. Because this network was hidden it represents an interesting access point for the tester. 
The Kismet scan identified that the network is using WPA-PSK, this information can be used in the next 
phase 
 
Cloaked SSID 
 
Figure 13 - Cloaked SSID 
 
SSID Revealed 
 
Figure 14 - Hidden SSID Replaced With Actual SSID 
This technique is an example of passive scanning which means that there is less chance discovery, the 
problem is that waiting for a client to connect can vary in timescale. Another technique for revealing a 
hidden SSID is to force the client to disconnect or de-authenticate. By observing the reconnect process it 
provides the tester with the desired network information. The drawback with this method is that it 
represents an active manipulation of the network. Active scanning is by its nature easier to detect and can 
lead to mobile client misbehavior. It is also possible to identify mobile clients and the networks they are 
searching for, this can be represented via a graph.  
Kismet creates an Autogroup Probe list that contains the probes by client devices. The output is recorded 
in Kismets .netxml file. To visualize the probe activity a python script called Airgraph-ng can be used to 
parse the information and produce a Client Probe Graph (CPG) map representing the wireless clients and 
the SSIDs they are searching for.  
Client Probe Graph 
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Figure 15 – Client Probe Activity Map 
The table below contains information on the three mobile clients connected to the TestWireless 
network. The tool was unable to identify the OUI, this is a unique 24 bit number that identifies the 
vendor. 
Network MAC Address Device Type 
TestWireless 60:21:C0:43:CB:04 Unknown 
TestWireless 2D:16:D8:B3:58:C5 Unknown 
TestWireless 5C:2E:59:0C:D7:EF Unknown 
Table 15 - Wireless Clients 
 
4.2.2 Result2A 
The result shown in (Fig.15) identifies three clients searching for the network with the SSID called 
‘TestWireless’ network. At this point we can make a note of the client MAC addresses as they may be 
useful when performing post-exploitation tests on the client.  
 
 
 
4.3 Phase 3 Exploitation Testing 
The third phase of the penetration test is exploitation. At this point the penetration tester has gained 
the necessary information to determine the encryption being used by the network. It was discovered 
that the TestWireless network is using WPA2. The next step is for tester to deauthenticate the user to 
capture a 4-way handshake or EAPOL, this is done using the aireplay-ng tool. After capturing the 
handshake the tester will perform a dictionary attack against a list of possible passphrase hashes, this 
technique can be performed using the Aircrack-ng tool.  
4.3.1 Result 3 
The pre-shared key 'doyouknowthemuffinman' was found using the steps outlined in Appendix 1.7. The 
brute force took 3 hours 6 minutes and 9 seconds. Now the tester can use the passphrase to 
authenticate to the network.  
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Figure 16 - Result from WPA-PSK Brute Force Attack 
A significant limitation with this technique lies in the fact that the passphrase must exist in the passphrase 
list which, if absent, can add a considerable amount of time to this portion of the test. On this basis, the 
tester must take the time to crack a key into consideration. 
    
4.4 Phase 4 Post-Exploitation Testing 
The fourth phase of the penetration test is post-exploitation.  In this phase, access has been gained to the 
network, so now the penetration tester can deploy a rogue AP.  It is the primary objective to lure 
legitimate network users to the AP so that they connect to it.  When this happens, traffic from the user’s 
web applications, mail clients and database connections will now be logged by the tester for further 
analysis thus allowing the tester to enumerate sensitive information such as usernames and passwords.    
4.4.1 Result 4 
Using the WiFi Pineapple PineAP and Evil Portal infusion described in the Appendix 2.0 it was possible to 
retrieve many login credentials thus demonstrating the efficacy of the exploit.  Figure 17 shows the 
malicious portal page developed by the tester to harvest those login credentials when they connects to 
the rogue AP (see Figure.17).   The portal page was specifically designed to have the look and feel of a 
legitimate student portal page so that the user would be more likely to enter their credentials.   Once this 
occurs the credentials are stored by the tester for further exploitation. 
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Figure 17 - Captive Portal Page 
 
The credentials entered by the user are then sent to the testers machine (Figure. 18). Once the tester 
has enumerated enough credentials they can use them to access other systems.  
 
 
Figure 18 - Credentials Captured On Attackers Machine 
 
4.4.2 Result 4 b 
The second post-exploitation test involves the use of the DNS Spoof infusion, which can be used to redirect 
a users web traffic, a step-by-step guide is described in the Appendix 2.1. Once a client connects to the 
WiFi Pineapple and requests a domain to browse, the user is redirected to an IP address of the penetration 
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testers choice.  In the test, the tester set the IP address to an instance of Kali Linux running the burpsuite 
intercepting proxy.  Figure 20 below shows a login page. 
 
 
Figure 19 - Altoro Mutual Login Page 
 
When the user enters their credentials, the traffic is redirected through the penetration testers machine 
and can be viewed by the intercepting proxy (Figure 21).  
 
Figure 20 - Request Intercepted using BurpSuite 
While it is clear that the Altoro Mutual banking application works over an http connection sending 
unencrypted traffic, an additional test was performed on the Facebook login page which is protected by 
SSL.  This was achieved by decrypting the traffic via a MiTM certificate which needs to be installed on the 
mobile device, typically through social engineering techniques.  Figure 22 shows how Safari makes the 
user aware that the certificate is not trusted and that the form is insecure.  However if the user clicks on 
submit the traffic can be decrypted and viewed. 
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Figure 21 - Facebook Login Page 
Figure 23 shows the HTTPS request being intercepted in Burpsuite. The POST request contains the users 
credentials. 
 
Figure 22 - Request Intercepted 
4.5 Evaluation 
The framework represents a structure for carefully developing a technical rationale which underpins the 
performance of any mobile wireless penetration testing strategy.  In its current form, we can identify the 
outcomes in a controlled environment which may be developed in a practitioner’s case thus permitting 
the development of appropriate decision models, particularly when ‘controlled environments’ are not 
practical.  The framework (in its current form) has the capability to support a comprehensive 
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interpretation of empirical results by enabling practitioners to distinguish between ineffective 
hardware/software and make timely corrections to any methodological flaws.  
Research literature and industrial publications recommend a multi-layered approach to defense when 
attempting to detect and prevent intrusions.  Among those recommendations several practical first steps 
include, but are not limited to, SSID cloaking to obfuscate wireless details, capping the strength of wireless 
signals to be bounded by the physical structure of the building and user awareness of the benefits of 
strong encryption of sensitive data at rest and in transit. It is true that progressive techniques to 
circumvent these measures may exist however, a solid foundation in basic practices are essential at the 
outset.  In the daily detection routines of the security practitioner, the timely identification of 
unauthorized APs is an important task.  Deploying APs with packet capture and RF scanning capabilities 
that trigger alerts when anomalies occur make this task easier however this is not to exclude the 
importance of regular physical checks in the building.  Enterprises can standardize such things as vendor 
type, SSID format, channel number and radio media types so that any changes will cause an alert which 
then trigger a series of steps to locate and pull the rogue AP off the network.  
Overall, penetration tests are carried out to evaluate the efficiency of existing security measures.  It allows 
organizations to identify information on protocols used, the types of connected devices and data streams 
that are sent over the network. It also allows organizations to make decisions on infrastructure upgrades 
and identify areas of risk to the critical assets.    A significant result of testing the framework lies in its 
scalability which is not bounded by ‘the controlled environments and may be adapted to many real world 
scenarios across a diverse range of hardware, software and industrial contexts.  This is important since 
enterprises face considerable challenges in designing effective policies to ensure privacy and enhance 
security.  The relative roles played major stakeholders in any organization are bound by governmental 
regulations as well as industrial auditing.  As detailed as these policies may be from a technical 
perspective, a responsible and pragmatic approach to protecting an enterprise also need to take into 
account the complexities of human behaviour by ensuring that any organizational changes are simple to 
understand and implement. Technological changes in the security field are rapid when we consider  the 
impressive development and uptake of growth of cloud capabilities combined with mobile technologies, 
so enterprises need to be adaptable to these changes.  The framework presented and demonstrated here 
is a relevant first technical step that the security practitioner may adopt to improve the security profile of 
any organisation. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5-Conclusions and Further Research 
5.1 Conclusion  
In designing effective security testing frameworks and models which are aimed at ensuring privacy and 
enhancing security, the opposing roles played the malicious user versus the security expert remain in 
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tension.  This work presented here offers a combination of reflexive mechanisms which may be adopted 
and enhanced by future researchers and current practitioners in the mobile wireless domain. Ensuring 
that the end-user adopts a more responsible approach to protecting themselves online is of considerable 
academic and social interest.  While progressive security policies attempt to deal with the complexities of 
bring your own device (BYOD), cloud-based solutions and the realities of unpredictable human behaviour, 
it is the rapidity of technological change in this environment that is the most challenging. Cheap and 
anonymous electronic devices are relatively simple to leverage when the obfuscation of an attack is 
needed or the movement of money.  Indeed, the perpetrators appear to feel comfortable in the 
knowledge that likelihood of being caught are slim given reports which indicate the escalation in certain 
types of attacks (Verizon, 2013; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014; Ponemon, 2014).  While fines and 
penalties are deemed to be more effective, state actors are finding it increasingly difficult to prosecute 
these violations considering the wider international context (Schneier, 2014).   
The analysis presented in this thesis delves into defining the structure and functioning of a penetration 
testing framework for mobile devices on wireless networks, in particular those networks using the 
802.11ac protocol.  While the study is highly focused, some recommendations for further work have 
significant implications worthy of further exploration in the practitioner context.  Literature revealed that 
functional niches within security testing on wireless networks highlighted the need for several more 
nuanced techniques as regards wireless hacking and by extension other similar systems.  The methods 
employed in the framework's development suggested a pragmatic approach which utilized current 
hardware and software products within industry.  Although a conventional framework offers a 
rudimentary understanding of the diversity and complexity of developing such frameworks the efforts 
described in this thesis effectively lead the way to possibilities for achieving further understandings in the 
future.   
Is it ever going to be possible to prevent the scanning of wireless networks?  Not in the near future.  
However, this work offers a significant advancement to the current forms of mobile wireless penetration 
testing strategies to improve the security profile of both the end user and in the organizational contexts.  
Results of testing show that the augmented framework is practically scalable in the practitioner’s context.  
This now enables practitioners to distinguish between ineffective hardware/software and make timely 
corrections to any methodological flaws.   This is lacking from current research literature and industrial 
practices.   Considering the defense-in-depth model recommended by many in security, it is 
recommended that virtual private networks (VPN) be considered so that sensitive data is not 
viewed/altered in transit, the implementation of stronger encryption with complex keys, the use of TLS 
and headers such as HSTS,  SSID cloaking will help in the obfuscation of wireless details thus frustrating 
the would-be attacker and upper limits imposed upon the strength of wireless signals placed in 
strategically secure locations are solid recommendations for basic practices.  Security testing is a dynamic 
multi-skilled endeavour.  Considerable advantages exist within the practitioner’s context, utilizing the 
augmented framework presented here.  Comprehensive efficiencies surrounding the assessment of 
empirical results of wireless network scanning and now permit the rapid implementation the most 
appropriate solutions dynamically.  This is important since there appears to be a lack of integrated 
solutions to wireless network testing among the dominant models for penetrations testing.  Combined 
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with the OWASP Mobile Top Ten (OWASPb, 2014) as a baseline, the framework presented here addresses 
this concern in particular as regards specificity in the area of wireless hacking. The series of practical steps 
that are presented here are straight forward to implement using commonly (and cheaply) found tools.  
Importantly, while tests were performed in a controlled environment the concepts are fully scalable in an 
industrial case which is timely give the rise in attacks against mobile devices and networks.   
Overall, penetration tests are carried out to evaluate the efficiency of existing security measures.  It allows 
organizations to identify information on protocols used, the types of connected devices and data streams 
that are sent over the network. It also allows organizations to make decisions on infrastructure upgrades 
and identify areas of risk to the critical assets.    A significant result of testing the framework lies in its 
scalability which is not bounded by ‘the controlled environments and may be adapted to many real world 
scenarios across a diverse range of hardware, software and industrial contexts.  This is important since 
enterprises face considerable challenges in designing effective policies to ensure privacy and enhance 
security.  The relative roles played major stakeholders in any organization are bound by governmental 
regulations as well as industrial auditing.  As detailed as these policies may be from a technical 
perspective, a responsible and pragmatic approach to protecting an enterprise also need to take into 
account the complexities of human behaviour by ensuring that any organizational changes are simple to 
understand and implement. Technological changes in the security field are rapid e.g. the impressive 
development and uptake of growth of cloud capabilities combined with mobile technologies, so 
enterprises need to be adaptable to these changes.  The framework presented and demonstrated here is 
a relevant first technical step that the security practitioner may adopt to improve the security profile of 
any organisation.  While there are advantages worthy of serious consideration by the security practitioner 
this work is also bounded by several limitations which may be overcome in future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Limitations of the study 
As indicated (pg. 41), at the time of testing2 there was a lack of 802.11ac support for wireless adapters 
that were capable of packet capture on the 5GHz range.  Overcoming this, it was possible to perform the 
required testing since the adapter and router were backward compatible.    
                                                          
2 2015 
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Field operatives in the security field adopt a pragmatic approach to testing since time and money are 
always limitations.  The software and hardware tools selected to develop this framework were largely 
drawn from the open source community and according to several security sources had excellent ratings 
in the field.  There may be other tools currently in development and unfamiliar to the researcher that may 
have worked also. 
Awareness of the legal and ethical frameworks of a jurisdiction is recommended prior to any penetration 
test, therefore legal documentation would be required in a live testing environment (see section 2.6.3, 
page 20).  Given the experimental nature of this work combined its technical isolation from any member 
of the general public to mitigate any potential harm, this requirement was deemed unnecessary. 
Further experimentation with different hardware and software was not possible due to financial and time 
considerations.  However, on the basis that the tools used were among the most commonly used this 
limitation may be overcome in further research which would refine this framework using industrial tools. 
 
5.3 Potential issues for future research 
There is recognition within the security industry surrounding the diversity and complexity of the 
environment in which practitioners must operate from the administrative policy level to field testing and 
reporting.  Maintaining integrity in the face of such challenging conditions requires interventions that 
need to be implemented quickly and effectively.  As previously mentioned, consent between the client 
and the penetration tester is vital otherwise the tester will carry out actions that violate data security laws 
which incur severe punishments.  In the light of today’s industrial reports which emphasise the need to 
develop a shared concern surrounding security, the complexity of international law in the area of 
cybercrime is becoming increasingly important.  Given the importance of audit and compliance, legal 
documentation is needed prior to testing which clearly defines the boundary conditions of the penetration 
test, the tools used and the ramifications of the techniques implemented.  If we are to manage security 
concerns and maximize the effectiveness of solutions aimed at supporting an appropriate security 
posture; academic, administrative, legal and technical resources must work together at all points in the 
system.  A need for more holistic, systems systems-oriented thinking is needed.  This study represents a 
starting point for this type of systemic review laying down preliminary steps at the practitioner level first, 
which may be further explored at a managerial level.    
 
References 
 
Abraham, J. & Smith, B., 2010. GISKismet. [Online]  
Available at: http://trac.assembla.com/giskismet/ 
[Accessed 28th January 2015]. 
48 
 
Aerohive, 2011. Aerohive. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.aerohive.com/pdfs/Aerohive-Whitepaper-Building_Secure_Wireless_LANs.pdf 
[Accessed 3rd October 2014]. 
Alsabbagh, E., Yu, H. & Gallagher, K., 2013. 802.11ac Design Considerations for Mobile Devices. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.microwavejournal.com/articles/19094 
[Accessed 5th October 2014]. 
Aruba, 2014. Aruba Networks. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.arubanetworks.com/pdf/technology/whitepapers/WP_80211acInDepth.pdf 
[Accessed 1st October 2014]. 
Atwal, R., Tay, L. & Cozza, R. e. a., 2014. Gartner. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gartner.com/doc/2639615 
[Accessed 5th October 2014]. 
Bajpai, P., Singh, N. & Vrijendra, S., 2014. Analysis of Current Wi-Fi Security Practices Via War Driving and 
Proposed Solution. International Journal of Advanced Computational Engineering and Networking. 
Blackmoreops, 2014. A Detailed Guide on Installing Kali Linux on VirtualBox. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.blackmoreops.com/2014/04/08/detailed-guide-installing-kali-linux-on-
virtualbox 
[Accessed 11th December 2014]. 
Borisov, N., Goldberg, I. & Wagner, D., 2001. Berkeley.edu. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html 
[Accessed 14th October 2014]. 
BSI, 2012. A Penetration Testing Model. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/Penetration/penetratio
n_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
[Accessed 26th October 2014]. 
Cache, J., Wright, J. & Liu, V., 2010. Hacking Exposed Wireless: Wireless Security Secrets & Solutions. 2nd 
ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. 
EC, 1995. Article 29 Working Party. [Online]  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/data-collection/obligations/index_en.htm 
[Accessed 29th October 2014]. 
EC, 2001. Convention on Cybercrime. [Online]  
Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/185.htm 
[Accessed 29th October 2014]. 
49 
 
Gartner, 2014. Gartner Says More than 75 Percent of Mobile Applications will Fail Basic Security Tests 
Through 2015. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2846017  
[Accessed 20th October 2014]. 
Gast, M., 2013. 802.11ac: A Survival Guide. 1st ed. USA: O'Reilly. 
Google, 2015. Google Earth. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.google.com/earth/ 
[Accessed 28th January 2015]. 
Hak5, 2014. WiFi Pineapple. [Online]  
Available at: https://wifipineapple.com/  
[Accessed 29th September 2014]. 
Hunt, T., 2013. The Beginners Guide To Breaking Websites. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/04/the-beginners-guide-to-breaking-website.html  
[Accessed 30th September 2014]. 
IEEE, 2007. IEEE. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ieee802.org/11/Reports/vht_update.htm 
[Accessed 3rd October 2014]. 
IEEE, 2008. P802.11 Wireless LANS. [Online]  
Available at: https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/08/11-08-0807-04-0vhtbelow-6-ghz-par-nescom-
form-plus-5cs.doc  
[Accessed 3rd October 2014]. 
Kirda, E., Jonvanovic, N. & Vigna, G., 2009. Client-Side Cross-Site Scripting Protection. Elservier, Issue 28, 
pp. 592 - 604. 
Kitchen, D., 2013. hak5. [Online]  
Available at: https://forums.hak5.org/index.php?/topic/30638-karma-not-working-on-mobile-devices/. 
[Accessed 30th January 2015]. 
Klee, M., 2002. The Importance Of Having Non-Disclosure Agreement. Engineering in Medicine and 
Biology Magazine, 19(3). 
Kumar, V., 2011. Three Tier Verification Technique To Foil Session Sidejacking Attempts. IEEE, pp. 1-4. 
Kuykendall, D., 2013. 7 Deadly Sins: Unlock The Gates Of Mobile Hacking Heaven. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.manvswebapp.com/7-deadly-sins-unlock-gates-mobile-hacking-heaven.  
[Accessed 21st October 2014]. 
Lashkari, A., Danesh, M. & Samadi, B., 2009. A Survey On Wireless Security \protocols (WEP, WPA and 
WPA2/802.11i). IEEE, pp. 48-49. 
50 
 
Marlinspike, M., 2009. New Tricks for Defeating SSL in Practice. In Black Hat Europe. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-
Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf 
[Accessed 12th December 2014]. 
May, M., 2004. Federal Computer Crime Laws, SANS Institute. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/legal/federal-computer-crime-laws-
1446?show=federal-computer-crime-laws-1446&cat=legal  
[Accessed 5th November 2014]. 
Meraki, 2009. Wireless LAN Security. [Online]  
Available at: https://meraki.cisco.com/lib/pdf/meraki_whitepaper_network_security.pdf 
[Accessed 9th October 2014]. 
MobileStatistics, 2012. Total Apps Available. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.mobilestatistics.com/mobile-statistics 
[Accessed 27th October 2014]. 
Moller, B., Duong, T. & Kotowicz, K., 2014. This Poodle Bites: Exploiting The SSL 3.0 Fallback. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf 
[Accessed 23rd October 2014]. 
Morrison, P. & Williams, L., 2012. An Analysis of HIPAA Breach Data. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/healthsec12/healthsec12-
final21.pdf?CFID=627211662&CFTOKEN=19401353 
[Accessed 16th January 2015]. 
Orrey, K., 2014. VulnerabilityAssessment.co.uk. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.vulnerabilityassessment.co.uk/ 
[Accessed 11th December 2014]. 
OWASP, 2014a. Cross-Site Scripting. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS).  
[Accessed 10th October 2014]. 
OWASP, 2014b. Mobile Top 10 2014-M1-OWASP. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2014-M1 
[Accessed 20th October 2014]. 
OWASP, 2014c. Session Hijacking Attack. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Session_hijacking_attack 
[Accessed 14th October 2014]. 
51 
 
OWASP, 2014d. SQL Injection. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection 
[Accessed 17th October 2014]. 
Perahia, 2008. IEEE 802.11n Development: History, process and Technology. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.iith.ac.in/~tbr/teaching/docs/802.11n.pdf 
[Accessed 5th October 2014]. 
Ponemon, 2014. Exposing The Cybersecurity Cracks: A Global Perspective. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.websense.com/assets/reports/report-ponemon-2014-exposing-cybersecurity-
cracks-en.pdf  
[Accessed 4th October 2014]. 
Pranshu, B., Nikhil, S. & Vrijendra, S., 2014. Analysis Of Current Wi-Fi Security Practices Via War Driving 
and Propsed Solution. International Journal of Advanced Computational Engineering and Networking, 
2(7), p. 2. 
Purviance, P., 2011. XSS In Skype For iOS. [Online]  
Available at: https://superevr.com/blog/2011/xss-in-skype-for-ios/  
[Accessed 11th October 2014]. 
PWC, 2014. The Global State Of Information Security Survey 2015. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/consulting-services/information-security-
survey/download.jhtml 
[Accessed 27th September 2014]. 
Salemo, S., Sanzgiri, S. & Upadhyaya, S., 2011. Exploration Of Attacks On Current Generation 
Smartphones. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~shambhu/documents/pdf/MobiWIS-2011.pdf 
[Accessed 20th November 2014]. 
SANS, 2006. Address Resolution Protocol And Man-In-The-Middle Attacks. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/threats/address-resolution-protocol-
spoofing-man-in-the-middle-attacks-474  
[Accessed 15th October 2014]. 
Schneier, B., 2014. Schneier on Security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/12/did_north_korea.html 
[Accessed 11th Febuary 2015]. 
Scholte, T., Balzarotti, D. & Kirda, E., 2011. An Empirical Study On Input Validation Vulnerabilities In Web 
Applications. ELSEVIER, Volume 348, p. 348. 
Studdard, P., 2011. The Web Application Hackers Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws. 2nd 
ed. Indianapolis: John Wiley & Sons. 
52 
 
Sukhija, S. & Shilpi, G., 2012. Wireless Network Security Protocols A Comparative Study. International 
Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering, 2(1), p. 360. 
Symantec, 2010. Firesheep And Sidejacking. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white_papers/b-
064_firesheep_sidejacking_WP.en-us.pdf  
[Accessed 19th October 2014]. 
Symantec, 2014. Internet Security Threat Report. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-
istr_main_report_v19_21291018.en-us.pdf 
[Accessed 12th January 2015]. 
Taddong, 2011. Vulnerability In Android: To add, or not to add (a Wi-Fi network), that is the question. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://blog.taddong.com/2011/05/vulnerability-in-android-to-add-or-not.html 
[Accessed 7th October 2014]. 
Takabi, H., Joshi, J. & Ahn, G., 2010. Security and Privacy Challenges in Cloud Computing Environments. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://sefcom.asu.edu/publications/security-privacy-challenges-privacy2010.pdf 
[Accessed 5th November 2014]. 
Thornton, G., 2009. The Law On Computer Fraud In Ireland - Development Of The Law And Dishonesty. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.grantthornton.ie/db/Attachments/Publications/Forensic_And_inve/Grant%20Thornton%20
-%20The%20law%20on%20computer%20fraud%20in%20Ireland.pdf 
[Accessed 31st October 2014]. 
Thoughtcrime Labs, 2012. CloudCracker. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cloudcracker.com/ 
[Accessed 15th January 2015]. 
UK, G., 2014. Using behavioural insights to improve the public's use of cyber security best practices. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/309652/14-835-
cyber-security-behavioural-insights.pdf  
[Accessed 3rd October 2014]. 
Wright, J., 2012. Dinosec. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.dinosec.com/docs/Apple%20iOS%20Key%20Recovery%20with%20iPhone%20Data%20Prot
53 
 
ection%20Tools%2020121003.pdf 
[Accessed 3rd December 2014]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Lab Setup 
1.1 Kali Linux 
Kali Linux is the next generation of the BackTrack penetration testing distribution. Kali Linux contains a 
vast amount of tools that can be used to assess security systems in different areas such as information 
gathering, VA, wireless, web, forensics (Kali Linux, 2014). 
Kali Linux can be run from a Live CD, USB or permanently installed on the hard disk. For the tests in this 
thesis Kali will be installed on  a virtual machine.  A step by step guide on installation of Kali on 
VirtualBox is described in the post by (Blackmoreops, 2014). 
1.2 Placing Network Wireless Adapter in monitor mode 
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The airmon-ng tool that comes packaged with the Aircrack-ng suite of tools can be used to place a 
wireless adapter into monitor mode. To identify the wireless cards on the system run the airmon-ng 
command with no arguments. 
 
Figure 23 - Wireless Card 
 
We can see in the example above that there is one wireless adapter called ‘wlan0’ associated with the 
physical interface phy0. Next to place this interface in monitor mode run the command ‘airmon-ng start 
wlan0’ 
 
Figure 24 - Wireless Card in Monitor Mode 
 
The airmon-ng tool will create a monitor mode interface associated with the physical device used by the 
interface with the name mon0. 
 
 
1.3 Enabling GPS support in Kismet 
Hardware Requirements:  
 Wireless Network Adapter - ALFA AWUS036AC 
 USB GPS Dongle - GlobalSat ND-100S 
Install GPS packages in Kali Linux i.e GPS daemon and GPSd client 
# sudo apt-get install gpsd 
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Figure 25 - Install GPS Packages 
 
Plug in Wireless Network Adapter and USB GPS dongle and verify that they are seen by the VM 
 
Figure 26 - Verify GPS Dongle 
 
We then start the gps device. 
root@kali:~#gpsd -N -n -D 3 /dev/ttyUSB0 
Start up Kismet, use the backtick to access menu options and select "GPS Details". You should see a 
number of satellites and signal strengths. 
 
Figure 27 - GPS Satellite Information 
 
At this point the site should be walked to gather the GPS data. Once this is done, you can verify that the 
GPS data has been written to output. 
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Figure 28 - Verify GPS Data 
 
GISKismet created a database file using Sqlite so that multiple instances of data can be added. The 
following command will insert the data from the .netxml file into the database. 
Once we do that we can query our database at any time and output the results to a kml file which is 
what Google earth will accept: 
 
Figure 29 - Convert Results to KML and Query Contents 
 
 
Open Google Earth, then open the file. 
 
1.4 Passive Scanning with Kismet 
Start Kismet from the terminal by typing ‘kismet’. 
 
Figure 30 - Start Kismet 
 
Select ‘OK’ at the warning about running as root.  
Next, select ‘Yes’ when prompted to automatically start the Kismet server. 
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Figure 31 - Start Kismet Server 
 
After indicating that you want to start the server, you will be presented with startup options. You can 
navigate between the options by using the spacebar to enable or disable options. We can enable logging 
so that we can store the capture file. Finally, navigate to and select start.  
 
Figure 32 - Enable Kismet Logging 
 
After starting the server you will see another prompt asking to add a data source. In the ‘Intf’ field enter 
‘wlan0’ the interface we have placed in monitor mode, you can also specify a name. Then select the ADD 
option as shown.  
 
Figure 33 - Add Wlan0 Interface 
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Immediately after adding the data source Kismet will start to identify and decode wireless network 
details. The menu can be navigated by pressing ‘~’ and the arrow keys. To maximize the network list 
display you can disable filters in the view menu e.g. Battery, Status and Packet Graph. 
 
Figure 34 - View Kismet Network List 
 
 Selecting a network and pressing enter will reveal further information about the network. This 
information includes encryption method, device manufacturer, SSID, channel and packets. 
 
Figure 35 - Kismet Network Detail 
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You may see networks in Kismet that are cloaked, displaying the <Hidden SSID> string for the network 
name. Kismet will replace the string with the actual SSID when a client connects to the network. This is a 
waiting game but it can be forced by disconnecting a client. 
 
Figure 36 - Hidden SSID 
1.5 Kismet Probe Groups 
Kismet creates an Autogroup Probe list that contains all the observed SSID probes by client devices. This 
information is stored in XML format. A tool called Airgraph-ng can be used to produce a Client Probe 
Graph (CPG) map allowing for greater visualization of the probe activity between devices. 
First we use Airodump-ng to parse libcap files created by Kismet. We invoke airodump-ng with the –r 
parameter, reading from the Kismet log file and outputting to csv. 
 
Figure 37 - Reading Kismet Log and outputting to CSV 
 
Airodump-ng will start to read the file , when you see ‘Finished reading from input file’ you can 
terminate with CTRL+C. 
 
Figure 38 - Reading Kismet Log with Airodump-ng 
 
When Airodump-ng exits you can run the airgraph-ng command to read from the csv file. You can 
specify the output to a png file. 
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Figure 39 - Airgraph-ng 
 
1.6 Cracking WEP encryption 
WEP or Wired Equivalent Privacy is an 802.11 standard used for encryption in Wireless LANs (ref).  WEP 
has two main functions, ensuring that traffic cannot be viewed by untrusted parties and to prevent 
unauthorized access to a network. The algorithm itself uses the RC4 cipher and 64-bit/128-bit keys to 
encrypt and decrypt and ensure the integrity of the packets.  Weaknesses in the key scheduling of the 
RC4 algorithm (Fluhrer, Mantin, & Shamir, 2001) were first identified in 2001. Although RC4 is still 
secure when used with recommended methods the researchers discovered that when using RC4 with 
WEP that it is significantly weakened. WEP’s flaws include lack of packet replay protection, weak packet 
integrity checks and the fact that it is possible to recover the key from a collection of captured packets. 
Each WEP packet must sent with a 4-byte header containing a one byte index number and a three byte 
IV. WEP key recovery relies on capturing a large number of unique IV values. 
 
802.11 Header IV Key Payload 
(encrypted) 
 
 
To demonstrate the key recovery attack we will use the Aircrack-ng suite that comes packaged with the 
Kali Linux distribution. Aircrack-ng is a cracking program used to recover keys from WEP and WPA-PSK.  
In order to capture the relevant packets, the wireless interface will need to be placed in monitor mode 
this can be done using Airmon-ng.  The command will return the wireless interface in this case wlan0 
and also information such as the chipset for the card and drivers installed. 
 
Figure 40 - View Wireless Card 
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To place the wireless interface in monitor mode the command below is issued. This will create the 
interface mon0 and place it in monitor mode. 
 
Figure 41 - Place Card in Monitor Mode 
 
The next step is to select a suitable access point (AP) or router from which to capture the raw 802.11 
frames. This can be done using the Airodump-ng script with the specified interface. 
 
Figure 42 - Airodump-ng Tool Capturing 802.11 Frames 
 
Airodump-ng provides a great deal of information described in the table below: 
Header Detail 
BSSID MAC address of the router/AP 
 
PWR Signal Strength 
CH Channel the AP is running on 
Data Initialization Vectors (IV) 
ENC Encryption used 
ESSID Name of AP 
 
It also provides information on the AP and the connecting client. The term non-associated displayed 
means that there is a client trying to connect to an AP by sending out probe requests. The field that we 
are most interested in is Data or IV, as discussed earlier in the paper in order to successfully crack WEP a 
tremendous amount of IVs are required.  Once the AP has been identified the next step is to capture the 
packets and place them in a file for analysis later, Airodump-ng can again be used for this. The channel, 
file to write to and the interface must be specified. 
 
 
Figure 43 - Airodump-ng Captured Files 
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Although the frames are being captured we need to speed up the process because we need a large 
amount of IVs, this can be done by performing an ARP replay attack.  
 
Figure 44 - ARP Replay Attack 
 
Once the attack is initiated the data/IV column will rise at a much quicker rate. While this is still running 
we can start to perform the crack to return the password. Using a combination of aircrack-ng and the 
capture file the attack can be launched. 
 
Figure 45 - Aircrack-ng WEP Password Crack 
 
This command may have to be run multiple times if the program does not have enough IVs. Once the 
password has been successfully cracked it will return the password in hex form. 
 
Figure 46 - WEP Key Found 
 
1.7 Cracking WPA-PSK encryption 
Similar to the WEP crack the first thing is to capture packets by placing the wireless interface into 
monitor mode. This is done using Airmon-ng. 
 
Figure 47 - Monitor Mode 
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The next step is to view the wireless traffic around us and identify a target AP.  
 
Figure 48 - Identify Wireless Traffic 
 
 
Then we want to capture the packets on a specific AP, this can be done by entering the following 
 
Figure 49 - Capture Packets on Specific AP 
 
 
 
Figure 50 - Airodump-ng Packet Capture 
 
This time instead of trying to increase the data (IVs) in the WEP cracking the objective is to achieve a 4-
way handshake. It should be noted that in order for this attack to work at least one client needs to be 
connected. The reason for this is that to create a 4-way handshake the client needs to be first 
disconnected and then reconnected.  De-authenticating a client is done using aireplay-ng 
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Figure 51 - De-authenticating a Client 
 
At this point a successful handshake will have taken place. You should see WPA handshake in the top 
right of the airodump-ng terminal. 
 
Figure 52 - WPA Handshake Captured 
 
The final step is to brute force the password with aircrack-ng in combination with a password list.  
aircrack-ng –w wordlist name-01.cap 
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Figure 53 - BruteForce PSK 
 
Certain considerations should be taken when choosing lists, the penetration tester should use a 
combination of dictionary, mutated and compromised password lists (skullsecurity). Another alternative 
solution is to use specialist online cracking services such as Cloud Cracker, the site claims to be able to 
run the captured handshake file against 300,000,000 words in 20 minutes  (Thoughtcrime Labs, 2012).   
1.8 WiFi Pineapple Setup  
The first boot of the WiFi Pineapple is set up as follows: 
 Insert the MicroSD card into the card reader 
 Power on the device 
 Wait approx. 5 minutes while the firmware is installed 
 Connect one end of the ethernet cable into your computer and the other end into the WiFi 
Pineapple 
 Open a browser and browse to http://172.16.42.1:1471. Follow the steps for configuration and 
you should see the screen below: 
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Figure 54 - WiFi Pineapple Login Page 
 
Next you need to setup internet connection setting. The testing in this thesis was done using a Windows 
machine. The steps for setting up internet connecting settings are as follows: 
 Open Network Connections. Right click the internet facing adapter and click Properties 
 From Sharing, check Allow other network users to connect through this computers Internet 
connection then click Ok 
 Right click the Pineapple facing adapter and click Properties 
 Select Internet Protocol Version 4 and click Properties 
 Check Use the following IP address and specify 172.16.42.42 (default gateway) and 
255.255.255.0 for subnet. Check use the following DNS server addresses and specify a preferred 
DNS server e.g. 8.8.8.8 
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Figure 55 - Configure Internet Connection Settings 
 
Click OK and then close. 
Now you can login into the WiFi Pineapple. There are a number of tiles on the screen, each tile 
represent apps or infusions. Infusions allow the penetration tester to perform different security tasks 
including information gathering to exploitation. Infusions can be downloaded through the Pineapple 
Bar. 
 
Figure 56 - Wifi Pineapple Infusions 
 
By default the Pineapple will broadcast a hidden network called Pineapple_5 and ending in the last two 
octets of the Pineapples MAC address. This can be changed to a more appropriate SSID by clicking on 
the "Network" tile and then navigating to the Access Point tab. The SSID can be open or secured. 
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Figure 57 - Setting Default SSID 
 
1.9 Karma/ PineAP  
PineAP is the prominent infusion of the WiFi Pineapple containing a suite of tools that automates MiTM 
attacks against wireless clients. As described earlier in the thesis, wireless devices send out probe 
requests to all of the networks on their Preferred Network List (PNL). Your device is constantly sending 
out these requests e.g. are you my home network?, are you my work network. When your device comes 
into proximity of that network, it responds to confirm that it is available. The device sees that the 
network is in its trusted PNL and automatically connects. 
PineAP sets up rogue APs based on those probe requests and gets devices to automatically connect to it 
and use its internet connection. This attack works well because the clients automatically connect to the 
Pineapple. Also clients do not check who they are connected to, they just see that they have internet 
access. PineAP is made up of a number of components: 
- PineAP is a suite of tools. 
- Dogma is responsible for sending out the beacons in your SSID list (targeted or to broadcast).  
- Beacon Response will follow up any probe request with a number of beacons. It responds 
directly to the client that is probing. 
- Harvester collects all SSIDs which can then be used for Dogma. 
 
In order to start PineAP you can navigate to the tile shown in Figure.59 below and click on start.   
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Figure 58 - PineAP Tile 
 
If you have a device that is on the compromised network you will a number of Access Point SSIDs 
displayed.  
 
Figure 59 - Rogue SSIDs Displayed 
 
 
 
2.0 Captive Portal 
Another infusion available on the WiFi Pineapple is Evil Portal. Evil portal is a captive portal, this is a 
page that is displayed in your college campus or coffee shop that prompts you to agree to certain terms 
and conditions before you can use the internet. The portal will normally request that you register and 
then enter your chosen credentials, or in a college campus the portal page will prompt you to enter your 
student Id and password.  
 
First you need to install the infusion through the Pineapple bar, once this is installed you can navigate to 
the Evil Portal tile and open it. The next step is to navigate to the 'Edit Portal' tab, it contains a sample 
HTML page that can be customised based on the scenario. 
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Figure 60 - Evil Portal HTML 
 
We also need to have some code on the back-end  to store the credentials. 
 
 
 
Figure 61 - Back-End PHP code 
3.0 PineAP, DNSpoof and BurpSuite Proxy 
DNSSpoof forges replies to arbitrary DNS address / pointer queries on the LAN. This is useful in 
bypassing hostname-based access controls, or in implementing a variety of man-in-the-middle attacks. 
For example, the IP address returned for a client lookup of the domain "example.com" can be replaced 
with that of the WiFi Pineapple. In this scenario, clients connected to the WiFi Pineapple attempting to 
browse to this domain may be redirected to the WiFi Pineapples local web server. 
 
The first step is to start PineAP. Then open dnspoof tab and navigate to the hosts tab. 
 
71 
 
 
Figure 62 - dnsspoof tile 
Set the IP address of the Kali Linux instance.  
 
 
Figure 63 - Set the IP address in hosts file 
In order to check the IP address type ‘ifconfig’ into the terminal 
 
 
Figure 64 - Check IP address in Kali Linux 
 
After that SSH into the WiFi Pineapple, you can use Putty to connect. You will be presented with a 
screen shown in Figure 65.  
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Figure 65 - WiFi Pineapple terminal 
 
Configure iptables to redirect all traffic through Kali. The commands can be entered line by line or 
placed in a bash script.  
 
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan1 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 443 -j DNAT --to-destination 
192.168.1.6:443 
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan1 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.1.6:80 
 
 
 
 
Figure 66 - Running a bash script 
 
Next configure BurpSuite to listen on 80 and 443. 
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Figure 67 - BurpSuite Proxy Options 
 
Wait for a client to connect 
 
 
Figure 68 - Client connecting to SSID 
 
When a client navigates to a page such as a login form shown in Figure 69, the traffic will be intercepted 
by the proxy tool. 
 
74 
 
 
Figure 69 - Altoro Mutual Login Page 
Figure 70 shows the POST request being intercepted. 
 
 
Figure 70 - BurpSuite Intercepting Credentials 
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Appendix 2. OWASP Mobile Top Ten 
 
M1:Weak Server-Side Controls  - Currently ranked first in the list of top ten mobile risks. This 
vulnerability is caused by weaknesses in the back-end web services or API calls used by mobile 
applications. When the mobile application communicates with the back-end resource it generates traffic 
in the form of requests, these requests can be intercepted and altered via un-validated insertion points 
(Scholte, et al., 2011).  This can cause the back-end resource to produce unexpected actions or errors 
leading to injection attacks such as SQL Injection.  These attacks occur when malicious SQL queries are 
injected into an application that is then executed at some point by the database. This type of attack can 
be prevented by using stored procedures or prepared statements.   
M2: Insecure Data Storage - While Weak Server-Side vulnerabilities focus on the back-end services, 
insecure data storage looks at the data that is left by applications on the device file system.  This 
vulnerability can be exploited when a mobile device is stolen or lost. Once the device is obtained a 
malicious user can gain access to the devices file system and decrypt the data by performing Jailbreaking 
(Salemo, et al., 2011) techniques. Common pieces of data that can be viewed by the attacker are 
usernames, passwords, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and transaction histories.  This type of 
vulnerability can be prevented by ensuring that mobile applications do not store sensitive data on the 
device. 
M3: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection - When sensitive data is being transmitted over a network 
consideration must be given to protecting it from sniffing attacks. Encryption should be applied 
throughout the application not just at authentication. If a user authenticates over HTTPS then is 
redirected to an HTTP connection after authentication the cookie used to track the user can be captured 
in plaintext allowing for impersonation of that user. This attack is known as SideJacking (Symantec, 
2010). Mobile applications must use Transport Layer Protection (TLS) to encrypt the data. The 
certificates should be using strong ciphers and be signed by a trusted CA. 
M4: Unintended Data Leakage - This type of vulnerability relates to how the underlying OS and 
frameworks handle sensitive data. An example of this is when a user clicks on the home button to send 
an open application to the background. On apple devices the last viewed page is screenshot and stored 
on the file system. The page may contain sensitive information such as credit card numbers or other PII.  
This can be prevented by setting the secure option on the field so that it is masked. Other areas that 
should be considered include the pasteboard and keyboard logs. 
M5: Poor Authorization and Authentication - This vulnerability can allow malicious users to bypass 
authentication and authorization schemes in order to impersonate other users. Mobile applications may 
be more susceptible to weak authentication than traditional web applications. Mobile devices and 
applications encourage users to set 4 digit passcode, although this makes it easier for users to 
authenticate it also makes it easier for attackers to perform brute force attacks. A practical document by 
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(Wright, 2012) demonstrates how a 4 digit passcode can be broken on a Jailbroken iOS device using 
commonly available open source tools.  
M6: Broken Cryptography - This flaw occurs when it is possible to convert encrypted text back into its 
original plaintext state. This can be due to weaknesses in encryption algorithms or the encryption 
process itself. Developers should never "roll their own" encryption algorithm or protocol and always use 
the strongest recommended protocols.  
M7: Client Side Injection - In this vulnerability the attacker leverages a flaw in the operation and use of 
the mobile device to inject code such as the execution of JavaScript or launching of an unintended 
phone call. Unlike server-side injection attacks described in M1 these flaws are present due to 
weaknesses on the client only.  An example of this vulnerability explained in (Purviance, 2011) was 
discovered in the iOS Skype chat application. This was caused due to a lack of input filtering on the 
remote users full name string which is displayed at the top of the chat window. To demonstrate an 
iframe was injected to cause an alert to be triggered. 
"><iframe src="javascript:alert(1)"></iframe> 
 
M8: Security Decisions Via Untrusted Input - This flaw can occur when an application is communicating 
with another process such as another mobile application. If the other application has being 
compromised then it causes a security vulnerability to be passed on. Because of this any communicating 
processes should be treated as untrusted and hostile.  An example of this is the use of the pasteboard 
for Inter Process Communications (IPC), this can cause data copied from one application to be read by 
another other application.   
M9: Improper Session Handling - Mobile applications utilize stateless protocols such as HTTP, SOAP and 
REST to communicate with back-end services.  In order to maintain state between a client and a server, 
mobile applications use session cookies to track authenticated users as the move through the 
application.  If an attacker gets access to the users cookie then they will be able to impersonate them, 
this is known as session hijacking (OWASP, 2014c). When considering session management developers 
should consider limiting the lifetime of session cookies to restrict the attack window. Cookie should be 
destroyed at the end of the period to ensure replay attacks cannot occur.  
M10: Lack of Binary Protections -This flaw involves reverse engineering of mobile applications. The 
vulnerability occurs when the following conditions are met - an attacker can change the logic of an 
application by modifying the binary, overwrite and redeploy it to market. An example scenario may be a 
mobile application that checks if a device is Jailbroken. It may be possible to overwrite this check in 
order to install it on a Jailbroken device.  
 
 
